Sun-tzu and Empires: Parallels and Applications

Discussion in 'General' started by The Buttery Lobster, May 12, 2006.

  1. The Buttery Lobster

    The Buttery Lobster Drama Queen.

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    Part 1 (Sun-tzu highlighted in bold)

    Most of the writings of Sun-tzu deal with deploying the military and choosing when, where, and how to prepare for battle. This includes maneuvering large forces, maintaining troop moral, and utilizing armies as opposed to armed masses (henceforth known as ‘nubs’)—very little is said about the actual tactics involved in a heated battle of equal troops on equal ground. This is the only engagement that exists in Empires, and I comment only on applicable statements. Such restricted commentary is probably for the best, as tactics can change a great deal in some 2600 years. This has been a mental exercise I find interesting, and I’d appreciate the analysis of true military thinkers, seeing as I have no military experience myself.

    THE IDEAL VICTORY

    “In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the [enemy’s] state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions second-best. Preserving their companies is best, destroying their companies second-best. Preserving their squads is best, destroying their squads second-best. For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” (177)


    “This accords with Sun-tzu’s overall emphasis on speedily wresting victory and subjugating one’s enemies without engaging in battle if at all possible… the idea of gaining victory while inflicting the least amount of damage on the enemy is generally fundamental… all commanders seek to minimize their own losses while maximizing the gains that can be realized. Occupying a thoroughly devastated state was never espoused by any ancient Chinese military thinker.” (309) This statement has some very clear implications in present day military forces; one of the mistakes of the current Iraq war is proposed to be the fact that the USA eliminated all forms of military and government related to the former Baath regime after the initial conflict, leaving little in the form of infrastructure.

    In terms of Empires, Sun-tzu’s message is very clear. The best victory is the victory that minimizes the loss of life to your own team. Be it NF or Bren, preserving your tickets is best, removing the enemy’s tickets second-best. The true pinnacle of excellence, therefore, is a swift ninjaneer or greninja (grenadier-ninja) that eliminates the opposing cv while preserving your own military might. One might even conclude that the best victory is one in which the enemy is so intimidated by your team, they all leave the server and you win by default. (theBlind)

    There are other quotations that focus on attacking the army before attacking a fortified city; we can safely assume there is a difference between a fortified city and a fortified military base. This is appropriate, because in Empires, to destroy the enemy’s base is to ensure victory. In any case, the overall message Sun-tzu conveys is that attacking a fortified position is more dangerous than attacking an unfortified army deployed in the field.

    DEPLOYMENT AND TACTICS

    “In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers… In warfare the strategic configurations of power do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?” (187)

    In Sun-tzu’s time, orthodox maneuvers were the simple, expected tactics—massive frontal assaults, direct heavy weapon (chariot) attacks, etc. Unorthodox attacks might involve circular or flanking thrusts. The key here is that the concept of orthodoxy is “dependent upon normal expectation within a particular battlefield context, as well as the enemy’s actual anticipations.” (148) The unorthodox will become the orthodox if applied with enough frequency, and vica versa. “Thus… the orthodox may be used in unorthodox ways, while an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when unexpected precisely because it is orthodox; a flanking or indirect assault would thereby be considered normal and therefore orthodox.” (148) The concept revolves around exploiting an enemy’s matrix of expectations and doing what they do not expect.

    In terms of Empires, one must look beyond individual matches. For example, an unorthodox maneuver is relocating the comm to a far forward base at the start of the match, because this move is seldom used. There was a commander named Cpatton online who used this maneuver every time, in almost every battle. While this tactic netted him some amazing victories, it also netted him some amazing failures. He used the unorthodox until it became the orthodox, the predicted, and the usual. When this happens, you have to adapt, and create a new strategy. Of course, to do so requires some knowledge of the enemy, and their plans. This is the focus of most of Sun-tzu’s work, and doesn’t apply to Empires. Sun-tzu specifies the advantage of using the unorthodox in this passage:

    “The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the position they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we will engage will be few. Thus if they prepare to defend the front, to the rear there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the rear, in the front there will be few. If they prepare to defend the left flank, then on the right there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the right flank, then on the left there will be few men. If there is no position left undefended, then there will not be any place with more than a few. The few [are the ones] who prepare against others; the many [are the ones] who make others prepare against them.” (191)

    “Here, Sun-tzu highlights his fundamental tactical principal: go forth where they do not expect it, attack where they are not prepared. Deception and deceit are often assumed to be the main role of The Art of War, but deception and manipulation are actually aspect of the greater question of form and the formless. Whenever the army deploys onto the battlefield, it’s configuration, being immediately apparent, will evoke a reaction in the enemy. Whether the enemy will then modify his original anticipations, vary his tactics, or view the events as confirming a preconceived battle plan depends upon his evaluation of other unfolding situation. In normal circumstances the disposition of the forces quickly betrays the average commander’s intentions and methods.” (137) Obviously, the best way to be formless is to display false appearances to the enemy.

    In terms of Empires, the application is quite obvious. If you can keep the location of your main attack a vague, if you can keep the location of your forward base a secret, and if you can keep the enemy commander guessing as to where those artillery tanks are about to strike, you can keep his frontline stretched thin across the entire map. On a map like Duststorm, this is a powerful tool. To do so would be very difficult, and as noted above, your standard commander might have trouble achieving this. Nonetheless, such vagueness should be the ideal goal of anyone who hopes to use the cv.
     
    Last edited: May 12, 2006
  2. The Buttery Lobster

    The Buttery Lobster Drama Queen.

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    Part 2

    Sun-tzu explains the advantage of attacking where the enemy is weak in the following statement:

    “Thus if I determine the enemy’s disposition of forces [deployment] while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with our many, those who we engage in battle will be severely constrained.” (192)

    “Here, Sun-tzu illustrates one of the basic principles for effectively waging warfare: attack voids in the enemy and employ substantial forces at chosen points.” (138) If the enemy doesn’t know where you will attack, he must inevitably disperse his forces and become fragmented to prepare against attack from every direction.

    In terms of Empires, this means simply that there is safety in numbers. Use your squads! Use tanks in tandem! But more so than simply working together, this means that a good commander can exploit weakness in the enemy’s frontline by hitting those isolated soldiers with many units, to ensure victory and enable your units to cap that ref while it’s totally unguarded.
    Sun-tzu explains the essential principle of formlessnessin the following paragraph:

    “Thus when someone excels in attacking, the enemy does not know where to mount his defense; when someone excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack. Subtle! Subtle! It approaches the formless. Spiritual! Spiritual! It attains the soundless. Thus he can be the enemy’s Master of Fate.” (191)

    DIRECT PARALLELS WITHIN EMPIRES

    “In general, whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race to the conflict will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men.” (192)

    “If the entire army contends for advantage, you will not arrive in time. If you reduce the army’s size to contend for advantage, your baggage and heavy equipment will suffer losses.” (197)

    These two statements show the difficulty involved in judging how much strength one should use when deploying your main forces. In the early game, seizing refs first can be the key to putting the enemy on the defensive. Late in the game, attempting to rush to early could risk you leaving behind your heavy equipment (tanks) can risk your army being undefended and easily beaten.

    “In order to cause the enemy to come of their own volition, extend some [apparent] profit. In order to prevent the enemy from coming forth, show them [the potential] harm. (191)


    In terms of Empires, the apparent profit might be an uncapped refinery. The potential harm might be the wicked looking heavy tank squad. This is further exemplified in the following quote:

    “If [an enemy] in close proximity remains quiet, they are relying on their tactical occupation of ravines. If while far off they challenge you to battle, they want you to advance [because] they occupy easy terrain to their advantage.”

    LEADERSHIP AND MORALE


    This is simply an analysis of how the team functions as a unit. The general is obviously the commander, the officers veteran players, and the troops noobies. In public servers, each of these units must play its part, or the team will be a messy, flame-war ridden guaranteed loss.

    “If you impose punishments on the troops before they become attached, they will not be submissive. If they are not submissive, they will be difficult to employ. If you do not impose punishments after the troops have become attached, they cannot be used.
    Thus if you command them with the civil and unify them through the martial, this is what is referred to as ‘being certain to take [the enemy].’ (210)


    Quite simply, if you’re the comm, don’t start yelling at your team right away. This will only piss them off. Likewise, don’t punish them by putting a barracks in the water when playing money, and don’t take a negative attitude about the outcome of the match.

    “Now if, when their strategic power is equal, [yet] one attacks ten, this is called ‘running [off]’.
    Don’t attack superior force.
    If the troops are strong but the officers are weak, it is termed ‘lax.’
    Make sure the veteran gamers can help out the noobies.
    If the officers are strong but the troops weak, it is termed ‘sinking.’
    Noobies are bad.
    If the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, engaging the enemy themselves out of unrestrained anger while the general does not yet know their capability, it is termed ‘crumbling.’
    Veteran gamers should work with the comm.
    If the general is weak and not strict, unenlightened in his instructions and leadership; the officers and troops lack constant [duties]; and their deployment of troops into formations is askew, it is termed ‘chaotic.’
    Noob comms=emp_kick_commander
    If the general, unable to fathom the enemy, engages a large number with a small number, attacks the strong with the weak while the army lacks a properly selected vanguard, it is termed ‘routed.’
    See above.
    Now these… are the Tao of defeat. Any general who undertakes responsibility for command cannot but investigate them. (214)

    ARTILLERY

    Sun-tzu employs incendiary attacks; that is, lighting stuff on fire. There can only be one parallel in the world of Empires: the artillery tank. Now, the statements below are pretty self-explanatory, and are probably a good guideline for fielding artys. They provide some interesting analysis if we can assume the enemy camp is the enemy team’s main base.

    “There are five types of incendiary attack: The first is to incinerate men… the fourth to incinerate armories, and the fifth to incinerate formations.”

    Only three arty attacks are applicable to Empires. Note here that the fifth refers to the ability for your arty units to disrupt enemy assaults in the process of a battle.

    “If fires are started within [their camp], then you should immediately respond [with an attack] from outside.”
    “If fires are ignited but their army remains quiet, then wait; do not attack.”
    “When they flare into a conflagration, if you can follow up, then do so; if you cannot, then desist.”
    “If the attack can be launched from outside without relying on inside [assistance], initiate it at an appropriate time.” (227)


    Reference: "Sun-tzu, the Art of War, Translated, with introductions and commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer." Westview Press, In., Boulder, CO. 1994. Sawyer, Ralph D., Sr. Editor. (I didn't reference correctly, stfu)

    I will revise this if and when I feel it is necessary.
     
    Last edited: May 12, 2006
  3. theBlind

    theBlind Member

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    The parts under empires related should be standart literature for every commander.
    If only.

    The problem in-game about binding your troops to you is of course that they don't fear dying, making martial punishment that much less effective ;)
    Seriously, the short term relationship between comm and troops means that troops have to subordinate themselfes to a larger degree than what could be expected from the comms actions alone.

    "The ideal victory" is not beating the enemy with minimal losses. It's beating the enemy without fighting. Examples would be if the US military might scares Iran into accepting controls and regulations for their atomic program.
    The empires parallel would be that one team looks at the others, all of them decide that they have no chance and go to another server.
     
  4. aaaaaa50

    aaaaaa50 Member

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    Which, in video games, never happens.
     
  5. Scoutbz

    Scoutbz Member

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    Crap Crap Crap, Mega Crap!

    Actually someone mentioned reading his literature to "unpimp zee rts skills", and everyone laughed at him, with due justification I might add. Adding the FPS element only makes it 1 dimention harder to follow the idealology through. The only possible applicable situation is a clan vs clan where one clan has read the whole deal and the other hasnt...

    At any rate, clan play usually conforms to such anyways. With pubs, well they are pubs and thats all you get from them.

    So the point is moot tbh.
     
  6. The Buttery Lobster

    The Buttery Lobster Drama Queen.

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    it's not going to reveal any mystical truths, it's only an attempt to point out parallels between this system and a popular book. If you want Empires strategy, try the Wiki.
     
  7. TheGreatHegemon

    TheGreatHegemon Member

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    I have read Sun Tzu quite avidly before.
    Anyway many of his strategies ARE applicable, when adjusted for the game.
    You can't harass supply lines - you harass the supply instead (res nodes). If the enemy is larger in number than you, you sure as hell try to avoid them. Etc etc. I could write one quite solid based of Sun Tzu for Empires.
     
  8. theBlind

    theBlind Member

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    Sorry, if oyu are referring to my comment, I didn't laugh. Indeed, I think that writings like Sun Tzus have very practical application - I read it myself and have long since tried to enulate much of what he said. To good results, I might add.

    You *can* get responses like that from a pub game. That's the point. Sun Tzu wrote as much about disposition of forces as he did write about psychology. And his armies starting situations was not so fundamentally different from the team you get on a pub server. Untrained, some good some bad, no teamwork training, small subgroups forming andworking either with or against the general - you'll find many parallel elements.
    My comment above was meant to said that in order to get a real chain of command, meaning players following you orders whenever given, needs more time or active submission by the player to be achieved during the course of a single pub game.
     
    Last edited: May 13, 2006

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